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Which Role for a European Minister  
of Economy and Finance in a European 
Fiscal Union? 
 
Zareh Asatryan (ZEW), Xavier Debrun (IMF), Annika Havlik (ZEW),  
Friedrich Heinemann (ZEW), Martin G. Kocher (IHS Vienna), Roberto Tamborini (U Trento) 1 
Abstract: 
The European Commission has proposed to inaugurate a European Minister of Economy and Fi-
nance with the broad purpose of streamlining the complex and fragmented decision-making pro-
cesses within the European Monetary Union. The Minister would jointly serve as Vice-President 
of the Commission and President of the Eurogroup, and have the tasks of coordinating budgetary 
instruments and structural reforms, designing and implementing adequate fiscal policies for the 
euro area, coordinating the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, among others. This 
policy report discusses the potential role the Minister could play in the development of the Euro-
pean Fiscal Union. The report lays out the main challenges along the current institutional solu-
tions facing several dimensions of the Fiscal Union, in particular related to fiscal sustainability, 
macroeconomic shocks, incentives of structural reforms, and the optimum provision of Euro-
pean public goods. The report then discusses whether and to what degree the new European 
Minister of Economy and Finance can provide appropriate solutions to these challenges for the 
Fiscal Union.  
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1 Introduction 
Following President Juncker’s statement on a possible “European Minister of Economy and Fi-
nance” (EMEF) in his 2017 State of the Union address, this idea has started gaining momentum. 
As part of the Commission’s “Roadmap for deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” 
in December 2017 (European Commission 2017a), the Commission has further elaborated on the 
creation of this new institution.  
This contribution focuses on this proposition by the Commission. It should be noted, however, 
that this proposal is not an isolated initiative. It is rather embedded in the long-lived debate 
about the necessity of reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) prompted by the mis-
management of the crisis and carried on by a number of scholars (e.g. Kuenzel and Ruscher 2013, 
Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015). The debate precipitated the plea to “complete the Union” with the 
Banking Union, the Capital Markets Union, the Fiscal Union, and the Political Union ('Five Presi-
dents Report' 2015).  
According to the Commission’s plan, creating the position of an EMEF should compensate for 
some of the Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) shortcomings by centralising responsibilities 
and roles from other institutions. The EMEF’s goal would be to streamline the complex and frag-
mented decision-making processes within the EMU, which is currently a product of multitudes of 
institutions involved in economic policy making. 
To increase the EMU’s governance and democratic accountability, the EMEF should therefore 
take on several responsibilities. The Commission has established a catalogue of the following 
possible responsibilities:  
External representation: While the euro has established itself as a leading global currency, the 
euro area representation within international institutions like the International Monetary Fund 
remains in national hands, despite formal coordination among the different representatives. 
These institutions assign various roles to the Commission, the ECB, the President of the Eu-
rogroup and the EU Council Presidency in international forums. To strengthen the representation 
within the EU and at the global level, the EMEF should promote the general interests of the econ-
omy of the European Union and the Eurozone, while also assuming the function of external rep-
resentation of the euro (European Commission 2017a, p. 3).  
Coordination of reforms: Structural reforms and economic policies are national competences 
and, hence, are not sufficiently coordinated on the EU level. While some progress on the coordi-
nation of economic policies has been made with the introduction of the European Semester, the 
EMEF should further strengthen these steps by promoting greater coordination among Member 
States for policy reforms (p. 3-4). 
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Stabilisation and fiscal sustainability: From the Commission’s view, the EMEF could take on major 
responsibilities to identify and pursue an adequate fiscal policy for the euro area as a whole (p. 
4). “Adequate fiscal policy” refers to stabilisation policies, along with “the broader goals of fiscal 
sustainability and redistribution” (p. 4). On stabilisation, the Commission communication 
stresses its growing interest for an aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area. The Commission 
envisages that the EMEF would coordinate Member State surveillance in applying the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Moreover, the EMEF should also promote the functioning of national fis-
cal frameworks building on the views of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) (p. 4). 
European budgetary instruments: The Commission communication envisions that the EMEF also 
coordinates “relevant EU and euro area budgetary instruments” with the aim to “maximise their 
impact in support of shared priorities” (p. 5). In particular, the communication outlines the In-
vestment Plan for Europe, and the relations between the Commission and the European Invest-
ment Bank.  
Institutional setup: The Commission also proposes a possible institutional framework for the 
EMEF that should result in more efficient governance (p. 5-8): The EMEF would be a Vice-President 
of the Commission. This minister could be also elected as the President of the Eurogroup, possi-
bly for the whole duration of the Commission’s mandate. Moreover, the EMEF would chair the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and, once established, the European Monetary Fund (EMF). 
In fact, the EMEF could already be appointed as Vice-President of the Commission as early as 
November 2019. She would represent the Commission in the meetings of the ECB’s Governing 
Council, be responsible for EU-level social dialogue and interact with important stakeholders. 
Ultimately, the EMEF would be held accountable to the European Parliament. 
To better understand the EMEF’s potential, it is essential to clarify the minister’s role in context 
of the ongoing reform debate on the new European Fiscal Union (EFU). We believe that the value 
created from the EMEF crucially depends on two aspects: the specific fiscal policy problem being 
addressed and the EU’s more general plans for the future EFU. To assess the value of the EMEF, 
we pose the following interrelated questions: 
- First, would an EMEF provide a well-targeted solution to the specific EFU challenge? 
- Second, in which areas would an EMEF be not helpful or even counterproductive? 
- Third, are there more optimal institutional arrangements than the EMEF for tackling EFU’s 
goals? 
In order to answer these questions, it should be noted that the EFU proposals are numerous and 
are still under considerable debate (see e.g. Delatte et al. 2017). The content of proposals differs 
according to the dimensions they take into account and how much (de)centralisation the pro-
posals envisage for each dimension. At least two of the main approaches are ones known as the 
“Maastricht 2.0 model” and the “US (or better, Confederal) model”. The former starts from the 
premise that the EMU regulatory framework has proved to be too weak and unable to constrain 
4 EconPol Policy Report    05/2018    Vol. 2    May 2018 
elected policymakers properly. Therefore, reforms should strengthen the original rule-based 
conception of the EMU embedded in the Treaties. Further fiscal sovereignty devolution is prefer-
ably towards independent, non-political agencies as guardians of the rules. The latter view is crit-
ical of a number of flaws that are present in the original regulatory framework, in the eyes of its 
proponents, and have played a role in the mismanagement of the crisis. These flaws are as fol-
lows: (i) neglect of interdependencies across countries, (ii) insufficient coordination of national 
fiscal policies, and in the aggregate with the common monetary policy, (iii) lack of common in-
struments of macro-stabilisation. Among others, examples for the various models are found by 
the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group (2012), Sapir and Wolff (2015) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2016), whose concepts are illustrated in Figure 1 of the Appendix. For each dimension, a higher 
score is associated with more centralisation. 
This paper does not take a position on which elements should be part of a promising EFU pack-
age. Instead, we concentrate on the following four EFU dimensions which show up most promi-
nently among various EFU proposals, namely:  
- Safeguarding fiscal sustainability of Member States in line with the objectives of the existing 
fiscal rules, 
- Stabilising EMU against asymmetric shocks, 
- Designing stronger incentives for structural reforms, 
- Finding the optimum provision of European public goods through the EU budget. 
Hence, this contribution disregards some other EFU dimensions where an EMEF might play a role 
like public debt restructuring mechanisms, her potential role for a new EMF evolving from the 
ESM and possible responsibility for an (EMF-based) lender of last resort. Furthermore, we note 
that the specific template on the EMEF proposed by the Commission, which is the sole focus of 
our contribution, is part of a much richer spectrum of models in the literature with at least three 
different variations of a possible design of an EMEF: (i) a single figure similar to a “High Repre-
sentative” (which is in essence the Commission’s view that will be discussed below), (ii) a Presi-
dent of an independent board, (iii) a Chairperson of a political body (or a “Eurogroup 2.0”). Model 
(ii) (see e.g. Villeory de Galhau and Weidmann 2016) is more focused on the aim of monitoring 
and controlling national policies in compliance with the commitments to fiscal discipline. This 
design is in line with the Maastricht 2.0 model of EMU reform. A more consistent design with the 
confederal model of reform would be given larger consideration to issues related to legitimacy, 
competency and normative powers. A natural solution is that the EMEF serves as the elected 
chairperson of a council of national ministers (i.e., the “Eurogroup 2.0”). This idea has been cir-
culated under various shapes: the European Fiscal Institute (Tabellini 2016), the Eurosystem of 
Fiscal Policy (Sapir and Wolff 2015), the European Federal Institute (Guiso and Morelli 2014), and 
it is also present in the latest reform proposal by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018). Tabellini (2016) 
proposes that (major) decisions, approved by majority voting, are then resubmitted to the EU 
Parliament. Obviously, conclusions driven here based on the specific proposal by the Commis-
sion do not necessarily hold for these alternative EMEF templates. 
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2 Safeguarding fiscal sustainability 
2.1 Underlying general problem 
The question as to whether or not the growth of public debt is on a sustainable path is a central 
consideration in any macroeconomic assessment of fiscal policy. Governments that ignore the 
solvency constraint are bound to cause great harm as default and high inflation have similar end-
points: a massive destruction of wealth, foregone income, and misery for those who cannot in-
sure against such risks, especially the less affluent in society.  
This explains why debt sustainability, along with price stability, is one of the two generally ac-
cepted properties of any desirable macroeconomic equilibrium, and therefore, key objectives for 
any finance minister including that of the EMEF. To get there, the traditional policy assignment is 
that monetary policy must actively pursue price stability by keeping national income close to its 
long-term trend (or potential). On the other hand, fiscal policy must be designed to avoid explo-
sive public debt trajectories (Leeper 1991).  
The institutional DNA of the EMU reflects a conscious effort by its founders to translate the tradi-
tional policy assignment in the particular context of a currency union where one central bank 
interacts with multiple treasuries. In this setting, monetary policy is in the hands of an independ-
ent central bank with an overarching objective to ensure price stability on the level of the euro 
area. So too must national fiscal policies comply with common standards of fiscal discipline that 
are deemed consistent with debt sustainability, and which are enshrined in rules meant to be 
enforced if needed. 
Compared to a single country issuing its own currency, the monetary-fiscal assignment problem 
is inherently different and more complex in a currency union. First, incentives to run active fiscal 
policies that stabilise national income – and therefore deliberately influence inflation dynamics 
– are greater because national budgets are the only national macroeconomic shock absorber left 
to confront country-specific disturbances. Moreover, with the EU’s monetary policy rates being 
close to their effective lower bound (ELB), the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal instruments 
are increasingly difficult to distinguish.  
Second, the interaction between one central bank and “N” national treasuries makes the union 
vulnerable to the fiscal situation of its weakest member (see Bergin 2000 for theoretical consid-
erations). In practice, this means that any currency union can face existential threats when debt 
sustainability is not uniformly guaranteed across all of its members because of spillover effects. 
Cheikbossian (2001) provides historical examples. The recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro 
area is another vivid illustration of this fact. 
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Third, because the currency union effectively insures Member States against the cost of fiscal 
irresponsibility at least to some degree (in the form of de-anchoring of inflation expectations for 
example) the threat of moral hazard arises. This is the most significant explanation as to why 
governments borrow beyond what a fully-informed and perfectly benevolent social planner 
would do. Beyond the moral hazard issue, other explanations arise due to unresolved common 
pool problems (i.e., a difficulty to prioritise competing demands on the budget), policies driven 
by short-term electoral considerations and a lack of public awareness of the corrosive effects of 
persistently high fiscal deficits. Evidence of excessive deficits is pervasive and has motivated ef-
forts to contain incentives for profligacy through a mix of fiscal rules (Debrun et al. 2008, Asatryan 
et al. 2016) and, more recently, independent fiscal institutions (Debrun et al. 2009). 
Ensuring public debt sustainability everywhere in the currency union was a key motivation be-
hind the Delors Report (1989) calling for supranational fiscal rules formulated as caps on deficits 
and debts. Subsequently, the report led to the Maastricht convergence criteria which have since 
morphed into various incarnations of the SGP – the first element of the Maastricht model. The 
second element of the Maastricht model is centred on the no-bail-out clause and the idea of mar-
ket discipline.  
2.2 Current institutional shortcomings 
Market discipline has clearly not been effective in the first decade after the euro’s introduction. 
When government bond yield spreads started to react to creditworthiness they did so in an ab-
rupt and discontinuous way leading to contagion and self-enforcing bad equilibria. One possible 
lesson from this experience is to increase incentives for sound public finance by more predictable 
solutions for insolvent countries through well-defined sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, 
accompanied by limits on sovereign bank exposure through concentration limits and sovereign 
risk weights. The main counter-argument is, of course, that the perspective of debt restructuring 
as a realistic possibility for large euro area countries could in itself be destabilising.  
Designing and implementing governance mechanisms that consist of fiscal rules, a set of moni-
toring measures, and a set of potential sanctions applied to non-compliers was bound to be dif-
ficult from the outset. It took only a mild downturn in the early 2000s, when France and Germany 
breached the 3% deficit-to-GDP ceiling and they had the Commission's Excessive Debt Procedure 
(EDP) rejected by the majority of finance ministers, to reveal the weaknesses of the SGP, namely 
too lax in good times and too tight in bad times. By 2005, the SGP had been made “smarter” (es-
sentially meaning that it was less likely to bind in bad times), thanks to explicit considerations 
given to cyclical conditions and more lenient escape clauses. Without surprise, the next – and 
this time major – crisis in 2008 led to another round of major revisions to the SGP. 
Today, EMU’s fiscal governance is a complex web of rules and benchmarks (Heinemann 2018) 
covering the levels and first-differences of almost all relevant macro-fiscal indicators: public 
debt, nominal deficit, structural deficit, and expenditure corrected for revenue measures. These 
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rules are written in countless pages of explanations that frustrate even the most dedicated civil 
servants of national treasuries. While it would be unfair to conclude that the dire fiscal situation 
in some of euro area Member States is solely a reflection of the EU fiscal governance failure, the 
lingering legacies of the global economic financial crisis and the even greater reliance on fiscal 
policy as a stabiliser and tool to promote long-term growth has further weakened their incentives 
to comply with the basic numerical rules. They have now been encouraged to pursue a maximal-
ist interpretation of flexibility as embedded in the SGP.  
Besides its complexity, enforcement mechanisms have not improved dramatically (Asatryan et 
al. 2015). The greater and disproportionate weight given to the Commission (relative to the Coun-
cil) in enforcing SGP in 2010 cannot serve its original purpose of reducing the politicisation of the 
process if this means opaque, disorderly and “weighted” bilateral negotiations. In the EU, where 
politics remain a local matter, voters have grown suspicious of uneven implementation of the 
SGP by the Commission. They believe that larger countries have been enjoying a quasi-impunity 
that have been denied to smaller ones. 
In this context, the establishment of an EU-wide independent watchdog – the EFB – which is ex-
plicitly mandated to judge the even-handedness of the Commission in implementing the SGP 
was certainly welcomed. However, as some of us argued in an earlier policy brief (Asatryan et al. 
2017b), the EFB comes across as a relatively weak body that has arguably grown too close for 
comfort to the Commission. At this stage, it is worth looking into whether the establishment of 
an EMEF and her role in fiscal policy coordination and surveillance is an improvement to the in-
stitutional setup. 
2.3 Merits of an EMEF  
The European Commission (2017a, p. 4) states that: “the Minister would coordinate the surveil-
lance of Member States’ fiscal policies, ensuring fiscal sustainability and applying the Stability 
and Growth Pact with the economic reading that the rules foresee.” One fundamental issue with 
the current EU fiscal governance is the “politicised” implementation of the SGP in a disguised 
fashion, as argued above. Thus, we need to ask first whether the new role envisaged for the EMEF 
is likely to lead to more or to less political meddling.  
According to the Commission, the EMEF would simultaneously serve as Vice-President of the 
Commission and chair of the Eurogroup. This would be equivalent to the US Treasury Secretary 
(an executive appointment) chairing a senate committee on States’ economic affairs. Needless 
to say that such an EMEF would probably be at the core of all political games in Brussels. It would 
also undermine the essence of the 2010 reform of SGP enforcement calling for a reverse majority 
voting rule to overrule the Commission. If the views of the Council (reflecting the web of national 
political considerations) make it straight to the Commission through one of its Vice-Presidents, 
it would be difficult to understand the value created from that reform. 
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The Commission press release nevertheless justifies its creation, stating that “by bringing to-
gether existing responsibilities and available expertise, this new position would strengthen the 
coherence, efficiency, transparency and democratic accountability of economic policy-making 
for the EU and the euro area, in full respect of national competences” (European Commission 
2017b). In terms of monitoring and evidence in connection with the fiscal situation of Member 
States, the European Semester includes several instruments on a fine-grained scale of analysis, 
for instance the Debt Sustainability Monitor or the procedures arising from the Maastricht Treaty 
and the SGP. An EMEF could perhaps make this set of procedures and analyses more coherent, 
transparent and democratically accountable, but it is a priori unclear whether they would be 
made more efficient. 
On balance, as far as the Commission’s EMEF model is concerned, we find it hard to argue that 
any efficiency gain stemming from greater coherence would outweigh the risks arising from more 
disguised and potentially disorderly politicisation. 
Given the emphasis on a “full respect of national competences” in the Commission proposal, it 
seems clear that the Commission’s EMEF would not exert significant additional competencies. 
Hence, we have to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposal in terms of fiscal sustainability, as-
suming the current set of rules and governance mechanisms, centralised at an EMEF. Would the 
mere existence of an EMEF lead to positive effects on fiscal sustainability on top of effects already 
present in the existing regime? 
Given the restriction to the current set of rules, the answer can hardly be affirmative. While it is 
conceivable that an EMEF could bring about more visibility and transparency to the existing pro-
cedures – which in turn invites greater external scrutiny – it is hard to imagine that enforcement 
and governance would change dramatically in the short and medium term. And even if they do, 
the far-reaching concept of creating an organic link between the Commission and the Council 
could plausibly lead to additional opaque political bargains. 
One can imagine, however, that the introduction of an EMEF, closer to the “Eurogroup 2.0” 
model, could have long-run effects conducive to fiscal sustainability.2 First, she could influence 
the debate over the long-run fiscal sustainability challenges coming from future expenditures, 
for instance, in the pension systems of the Member States. Second, creating the position of the 
EMEF could be only a first step in establishing new rules and governance mechanisms that are 
more effective than the existing ones. Given that there is room for improvement in terms of the 
incentive mechanisms, a stronger focus on reforms of the rules that would be personalised in the 
form of an EMEF could be helpful. 
                                                                  
2 Andreozzi and Tamborini (2017) show theoretically that a policy coordination body that aggregates symmetrically national prefer-
ences can achieve Pareto-improving policy assignments to governments with respect to non-cooperative policies. If national prefer-
ences are distant they can be aggregated asymmetrically with more weight given to the country which bears the larger marginal loss 
(generally the one which is less averse to the optimal policy). 
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That being said, it is not too difficult to think of improvements to the design of EU fiscal govern-
ance in ways that make it less vulnerable to an increased risk of politicisation. In broad terms, we 
would recommend prioritising the following measures: 
- Simplify inconsistent and overlapping rules that make the SGP effectively unreadable 
(Heinemann 2018). The main value of fiscal rules is to make fiscal behaviour more predicta-
ble and provide clear direction to policymakers in the longer run. A number of sensible pro-
posals have been made elsewhere and they deserve serious considerations. The EFB – or a 
reformed, more independent and better resourced variant of it – could play a useful role in 
initiating such a proposal. The EFB already has skin in the surveillance game and an institu-
tional incentive to get it right from an EU-wide perspective. 
- Create a clear hierarchy of rules and institutions (see e.g. Ódor 2017). Especially for the EU, 
it is essential to clarify the roles of national rules, supranational rules and independent fiscal 
institutions (IFI). To create an effective hierarchy, the following question should be ad-
dressed: should EU rules be binding only when national rules do not appear to offer suffi-
cient guarantees against unmanageable profligacy? Any reform in that direction again begs 
the need for a strengthened and fully independent EFB playing an expanded monitoring 
function of SGP implementation, equivalent to what national IFIs do at the country level. 
Should the EMEF proposal be implemented as currently envisaged, good balance would at 
a minimum suggest to loosen any link between the EFB and the Commission and to subject 
the EMEF to a comply-or-explain clause as regards EFB’s assessments. 
2.4 Conclusion EMEF and fiscal sustainability 
Ensuring public debt sustainability in all members of a currency union is critical for the viability 
of the union. This is achieved through a complex web of rules and institutions aimed at establish-
ing common standards of fiscal responsibility. While the view that putting the EMEF in charge of 
implementing the SGP for the purpose of efficiency has its merits in efficiency terms, we still see 
a risk that such gains could be offset by greater politicisation. Priorities in the reform of EU fiscal 
governance are arguable found elsewhere. They include a significant simplification of the current 
maze of rules and independent institutions, including a clear hierarchy between national and 
supranational arrangements, and simpler supranational rules. Should the idea of an EMEF be 
implemented as originally planned, risks could be mitigated by reforming the EFB. Asatryan et 
al. (2017b) outlines effective reforms, including designating the EFB as an independent arm and 
expanding its ability to play a genuine monitoring function of SGP implementation. 
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3 Stabilising EMU against macroeconomic shocks 
3.1 Underlying general problem 
Establishing macroeconomic stabilisation in the EMU is puzzling. Since the 1990’s, the general 
academic consensus has been that demand fluctuations are larger and more frequent than those 
on the supply side, and that a number of “frictions” require active stabilisation polices in order 
to smooth major slumps and restore welfare. In this perspective, the stabilisation capacity of the 
EMU apparatus, with a single centralised monetary policy vis-à-vis constrained national fiscal 
policies, has raised scepticism from the very beginning, and indeed it has proved to be largely 
inadequate in the face of the crisis (De Grauwe and Ji 2013b, Manasse 2015, Corsetti et al. 2017, 
Fragetta and Tamborini 2017).3 Therefore, enhancing stabilisation capacity ranks high in the 
agenda of EMU reforms (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2016, Part 3; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). 
From the institutional point of view, creating new common stabilisation tools is less demanding 
in comparison to other more ambitious steps towards further integration (De Grauwe and Ji 
2013a, Gros 2017). Concerns that stabilisation tools could be abused for transfers between Mem-
ber States generate political resistance. This legitimate concern may be mitigated stressing that 
the primary end of the EMEF is stabilisation of symmetric shocks, i.e., aggregate disruptive events 
that by and large affect the whole area, and which may possibly exhaust the ECB stabilisation 
capacity. Had the EU taken concrete innovations for fiscal insurance in due time, the effects of 
the crisis would probably have been less dramatic, not least for the credibility of the EMU in the 
eyes of the citizens. Stabilisation tools generally include fiscal policy coordination and the aggre-
gate fiscal stance, as well as the so-called “shock absorbers”, the main instances of which are 
countercyclical public investments and unemployment insurance schemes. These tools could 
complement, but should not crowd out, the necessary capacity of each country for self-insurance 
and resilience to shocks. 
3.2 Current institutional shortcomings 
Fiscal policy coordination: International relations theory suggests that countries with reciprocal 
(negative) externalities can enjoy welfare gains if they coordinate policies with others instead of 
pursuing independent policies (Alesina et al. 2005b, 2017, Andreozzi and Tamborini 2017). These 
gains can be even larger when the union-wide monetary policy is constrained by the effective 
lower bound (ELB) on interest rates. The advantages of cooperation explain why the aggregate 
fiscal stance is important to resolving the current account imbalances within the EMU. Whereas 
the relevance of intra-EMU imbalances is questionable, it is clear that the overall monetary/fiscal 
                                                                  
3 Not least because the magnitude and extensions of “frictions” has turned out to be far more disruptive than conceived in the main-
stream stabilisation policy blueprint.“ It was tempting for macroeconomists and policymakers alike to take much of the credit for the 
steady decrease in cyclical fluctuations from the early 1980s on and to conclude that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. 
We did not resist temptation. The crisis clearly forces us to question our earlier assessment.” (Blanchard et al. 2010, p. 1) 
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stance is a key determinant of the external current account of the EMU as a whole, which is in 
turn relevant to the evolution of the euro exchange rate. The fallacy of composition of national 
policies may be the unpleasant result. We see the symptoms of a dysfunctional macro-policy with 
the appreciation of the euro before the ECB quantitative easing and the emergence of a sizeable 
external surplus of the Eurozone which went hand in hand with a contraction of economic activ-
ity locally and around the world. 
Formal policy coordination devices were not contemplated in the Treaties for two reasons. The 
first was the lack of sufficient political agreement among member countries. The second was the 
theoretical recommendation to safeguard the autonomy of monetary policy according to the 
then dominant doctrine known as “monetary dominance” vs. “fiscal dominance”.  
The SGP can be regarded as an implicit coordination device respecting fiscal sovereignty formally 
while simultaneously granting “monetary dominance”. Whatever the overall assessment of the 
SGP is given its history, there are two major problems: First, the SGP was too weak to guarantee 
that Member States build sufficient fiscal buffers in good times. Excessive spending in boom 
times severely limited the fiscal space in numerous countries on the eve of the crisis period (An-
drle et al. 2015). Second, a lack of coordination of fiscal policies during the crisis, e.g. between 
countries with less and more fiscal space, has been detrimental for each country and the EMU as 
a whole (as predicted by models of policy coordination failures; in’t Veld 2013, Berti et al. 2013, 
European Commission 2014, Alcidi et al. 2015). Improvements on this ground require a formal 
institution devoted to fiscal policy coordination as a complement to the rule-based mechanisms. 
The necessary steps, however, may just be incremental with respect to the existing EMU archi-
tecture. 
Potential for self-insurance: The debate on new stabilisation mechanisms often underestimates 
the potential of self-insurance for countries with sound fiscal policies. Hence, the current de-
mand for new stabilisation tools is also related to the fact that some euro countries have effec-
tively lost their fiscal manoeuvrability due to high levels of debt accumulated during good times. 
From this perspective, a strategy of debt reduction is also conducive to regain own scope for an-
ticyclical national policies. In this sense, adherence to the long-run sustainability of the SGP 
should also be seen as strategy to improve the stabilisation capacities of the euro area. One ad-
vantage of better coordinated macro-policies is that it encourages the states to build up buffers 
during good times. Because coordinated stabilisation is based on each country's fiscal space, 
and hence each of their capacities to issue and sustain new debt, Member States have incentives 
to pursue buffers. Countries with low buffers are allowed to have less fiscal stimulus in bad times. 
In a coordinated equilibrium, each country creates a larger buffer than in a non-cooperative equi-
librium or in a rule-based system with penalty (Andreozzi and Tamborini 2017). From this view, 
coordination and self-insurance may be mutually reinforcing. 
12 EconPol Policy Report    05/2018    Vol. 2    May 2018 
Common shock absorbers: Countries hit by adverse shocks and with initially little fiscal space tend 
to cut public investments first. This is unfortunate because public investments sustain employ-
ment and aggregate demand in the short run and may foster potential output in the long run. A 
first attempt in this direction has been made with the so-called Juncker Plan (Buti 2014). As to 
targeted shock absorbers, such as unemployment insurance schemes, the notorious hurdle, as 
in all insurance mechanisms, is moral hazard. In the EMU context, this means that the mechanism 
could hide permanent transfers to “weak” members. This argument presumes the inability to 
distinguish between a shock and a permanent state. While this distinction is difficult to make, the 
EU has adopted the Fiscal Compact based on that distinction. Substantial progress has been 
made on the technical grounds and a variety of proposals are available (more recent products 
include Brandolini et al. 2016, Beblavý and Lenaerts 2017, Dullien and Pérez del Prado 2018). 
However, numerous EMU reform contributions argue that the mutation of a stabilisation into a 
transfer system can only be credibly excluded with a yet non-existent debt restructuring mecha-
nism (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018, Fuest and Heinemann 2017, Fuest et al. 2016). 
3.3 Merits of an EMEF  
An EMEF would likely be responsible for stabilisation policies as, indeed, she could take decisions 
from a euro area perspective. Hence, she has a potential to mitigate the problem that decentral-
ised stabilisation policies will only provide a suboptimal dose of anti-cyclical measures. For this 
purpose, the EMEF could serve two functions: First, she would coordinate the appropriate aggre-
gate euro area fiscal stance and directs Member States on their appropriate contribution. And 
second, she would be responsible for any new euro area stabilisation instruments. 
While the first competency would already have potential today, the second hinges on the out-
come of current reform debates (euro area budget, European Investment Fund, new EMU financ-
ing tools). The more these new instruments materialise, the larger the potential responsibilities 
of an EMEF. In line with our argumentation in section 2, we do not think that an EMEF would 
properly act as an SGP watchdog including decisions on SGP escape clauses. Instead, this task 
would be best left to independent fiscal institutions. Hence, the EMEF’s coordination role of na-
tional fiscal policy would lie within constraints as defined by the SGP. Given that three waves of 
SGP reform have considerably increased its flexibility, this should not be a detrimental con-
straint. 
Coordination of fiscal stance: The EMEF could provide guidance to the Member States on using 
fiscal space (available within the limits of the SGP) to create an appropriate European fiscal 
stance in the aggregate. The centralisation of these mechanisms to an EMEF may offer more uni-
formity, predictability, transparency and peer monitoring. This becomes particularly important, 
when conventional monetary policy loses grip on the liquidity markets and interest rates fall to 
zero, coordination with aggregate fiscal policy becomes a necessity (Corsetti et al. 2017).  
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Steering of new euro area stabilisation tools: Common shock absorbers may take various forms, 
but they share two characteristics that distinguish them from the EMU stabilisation discussed 
above. First, they may be designed as automatic devices, so that they entail less political discre-
tion on the shoulders of the EMEF. Second, these shock absorbers require a common pool of re-
sources, i.e., they presuppose the existence of an EMU budget, and this requires an additional, 
uneasy, step towards integration. The creation of a common budget is eminently a political 
choice that we cannot discuss here. It can be said that the advantage of financing shock absorb-
ers with common resources is that the national budgets become lighter and more flexible, grant-
ing Member States more fiscal space and preventing major tensions between fiscal stabilisation 
and national budget constraints. Moreover, if the shock is symmetric, the absorbers are triggered 
simultaneously and provide automatic coordination. Even though the automatism of shock ab-
sorbers would avoid significant discretion, the EMEF would still be mandated to steer and/or co-
ordinate the new tools with a comprehensive euro area perspective. 
3.4 Conclusion EMEF and stabilisation 
The EMEF’s success depends on the outcome of the ongoing EMU reform debate. In case of a new 
central stabilisation tool, economies of scale (e.g. Ricardian effects are much smaller at the 
higher level than at the lower level) and positive externalities (through supply chains and aggre-
gate demand spillovers) can arise and might be even larger when the ELB is met. Without any 
upcoming breakthroughs on the new central stabilisation tool, the EMEF’s role on stabilisation 
policy would be confined to the coordination of national fiscal policies, with the objective to re-
alise an appropriate euro area fiscal stance.  
Of course, the idea to encourage additional spending (and higher deficits) in countries with fiscal 
space for the sake of an “appropriate euro area fiscal stance” will be met with resistance both in 
countries with larger fiscal space but which do not want to erode it and in countries with little 
fiscal space willing to spend more. Moreover, these proposals would step out of bounds of the 
Maastricht contract which only had announced fiscal constraints for Member States with exces-
sive debt and deficits. The question is whether an EMEF could convince Member States to take 
on fiscal constraints for the purpose of EMU-wide coordination.  
Furthermore, another important role emerges with new stabilisation tools like a euro area 
budget or an outright shock absorbing stabilisation tool. Here the EMEF would have a natural 
role to oversee and coordinate these new instruments. 
14 EconPol Policy Report    05/2018    Vol. 2    May 2018 
4 Stronger incentives for structural reforms 
4.1 Underlying general problem 
Delayed structural reforms can harm potential growth and resilience to idiosyncratic shocks, 
which in turn damages the entire union. Even though Member States are aware of the needed 
reforms, changes have often been implemented slowly and piecemeal, reducing their overall im-
pact. Often, they were implemented under the pressure of events, when the policy space that 
could buffer some of the inherent costs (either aggregate or distributive) is stretched thin (Pitlik 
and Wirth 2003). Researchers have discussed what makes European countries special in their ap-
proach to reform (see, e.g., Heinemann and Grigoriadis 2016). For our purposes, we hold that 
Member States’ high aversion to risk—as the individual effects of reforms are highly uncertain—
and their appetite for equity that makes it easier for the losers in the reform process to gain po-
litical support (see e.g. Debrun and Pisani-Ferry 2006).  
The economic case for structural policy coordination remains a priori unclear (Tabellini and Wy-
plosz 2004). First, spillovers from supply-side policies can be negative, as reformers likely im-
prove their competitive edge over laggards. In that context, policy competition (non-coopera-
tion) may yield more reforms than coordination. Second, collaboration among states may in fact 
hinder the process of tailoring solutions to country-specific structural gaps and political econ-
omy constraints. 
On the other hand, the lack of coordination within the currency union can lead to inefficiencies 
when policies entail cross-border externalities. First, better functioning labour and product mar-
kets increase the overall resilience of national economies and foster real convergence, facilitat-
ing the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB. Second, coordination could offset reduced incen-
tives for members of a currency union to enact reforms because of the lower risk of currency crisis 
and runaway inflation. Third, higher output growth associated with such reforms is contagious 
and enhances fiscal sustainability through dynamic revenue collection in the entire union. 
Beyond the positive externalities associated with cooperation, coordination may be beneficial 
because of economies of scale. This takes place when one country learns from neighbouring 
countries’ policy experimentation (Gassebner et al. 2011, Asatryan et al. 2017a). Political leaders 
of Member States realise that poor decision making will entail a reputational cost to them and 
have incentive to coordinate. To facilitate the diffusion of political information, Vertical Assis-
tance Program can be further promoted (Asatryan et al. 2017a).   
At the current juncture, there are added benefits to mandating an EMEF that cheers for national 
success and shames poor policymaking. Structural reforms implemented during the crisis—
hence at higher costs and lower return—combined with the return of more benign growth condi-
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tions and the fading memory of existential threats to the euro may give rise to widespread com-
placency. “Fixing the roof when the sun is shining” is the kind of conventional wisdom that flies 
in the face of short-term political motivations. Because an EMEF is less constrained by local pol-
itics and better aware of the union-wide benefits of more resilient national economies, she could 
play a key role in fostering the coordination needed to offset reform complacency.  
4.2 Current institutional shortcomings 
The EU does have influence over financial, and to a lesser extent, product market reforms. Many 
critical areas of structural reforms, most notably labour and fiscal reforms, remain in national 
hands. While interdependencies exist to bridge the Member-State-EU gap, e.g. product and la-
bour market reforms complement each other, existing coordination procedures are too weak to 
be useful. Moreover, expectation that policymakers may seek to exploit such complementarities 
could magnify opposition to reforms. The fact that resistance to the so-called services directive 
in the early 2000s was motivated by its alleged labour market implications is a case in point 
(Debrun and Pisani-Ferry 2006).  
Currently, the two potential central levers to foster reforms operate through both the European 
Semester and the implementation of the SGP. The European Semester by and large replicates 
the open method of coordination that had failed under the Lisbon strategy. Deroose and Griesse 
(2014) observe that in 2012-13, only around 10% of all country-specific recommendations have 
been fully or largely implemented. Legally enforceable reforms remain limited to competencies 
that are “exclusive” or “shared”.  
On the other hand, SGP provisions allow the use of available fiscal space to enable desirable 
structural reforms. The complementarities between accommodative fiscal policy and structural 
reforms have been analysed at length elsewhere (Gaspar et al.2016). One very relevant concern 
is to somewhat relax political constraints through the compensation of losers of reforms and 
through raising the possibility to cash in early on reforms by boosting aggregate demand in sync 
with the reduction of supply bottlenecks. 
Crucially, current discussions about elements of a fiscal union such as a central fiscal capacity 
(Buti and Muñoz 2016, European Commission 2016) and other risk-sharing mechanisms (e.g., 
through a Banking Union) raise additional concerns on the reform front. The moral hazard issue 
inherent in risk-sharing can only weaken Member States’ incentives to increase their economies’ 
resilience with politically costly reforms (Vandenbroucke et al. 2016). Hence, the collective ben-
efits of a stronger currency union should somehow make its way to national incentives driven by 
local politics. 
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4.3 Merits of an EMEF  
The Commission’s communication on the role of an EMEF (European Commission 2017a) explic-
itly recognises the ministry’s potential role in promoting the implementation of structural re-
forms in the Member States, which strengthens economic policy coordination across different 
areas as well as in contributing to the reform agenda for the EU as a whole. In the context of this 
paper, we try to understand why an EMEF should play a role in advancing structural reforms and 
how she could achieve this goal. 
As to the “why” the arguments rest on the case for coordination of national reform strategies. In 
principle, the case for international policy coordination is premised on the existence of econo-
mies of scale and externalities which, if ignored by individual Member States, may result in a low-
reform equilibrium. The follow-up question is whether the EMEF is better placed to coordinate 
reforms than other existing institutions, most notably the European Semester and the SGP; or 
whether an EMEF could strengthen these institutions. 
As to the “how” the discussion boils down to the weak coordination procedures of national poli-
cies within the European Union, especially those regarding structural policies. Coordination re-
lies mostly on benchmarking and peer pressure—the so-called “open method of coordination.” 
It is only at the margin that the EU fiscal framework can provide carrots to reformist governments 
in the form of a potentially more lenient implementation of the common fiscal rules. Absent pol-
icy delegation to the centre – a prospect that does not seem politically conceivable – the answer 
must lie in the incentives provided to Member States. How could an EMEF develop and manage 
such incentives is the core of the matter. Thus the central challenge is to find a politically palat-
able middle ground between an approach that does not work – open coordination – and one that 
remains largely illusory – delegation to the centre. 
As a driver for reform, the EMEF could use a number of levers to create incentives for Member 
States, in particular: 
- The EMEF could become a key player in naming and shaming countries that have not fol-
lowed through on their commitments on structural reforms. Experience with the SGP sug-
gests that the credibility of formal sanction mechanisms is non-existent. Instead, a vocal and 
visible EMEF supported by persuasive analysis and good communication could amplify the 
reputational costs of lagging behind. 
- The EMEF’s role as an advocate of reforms could place her in a key advisory role when using 
fiscal space to promote reforms is envisaged under the SGP. For instance, Member States 
could only request exceptions for structural reforms under the SGP if those have been vet-
ted by the EMEF. 
- To limit states’ moral hazard (which is inherent to other components of the fiscal union), the 
EMEF could condition access to such instruments—e.g. the central fiscal capacity or other 
financing mechanisms—to guarantee compliance with agreed reforms programs.  
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- The EMEF could organise a systematic exchange of information on structural reforms, their 
effects among Member States and best practices. This would facilitate learning and magnify 
the political economies of scale by raising the perceived costs of being a laggard. The EMEF 
could also inform and advise Member States on specific complementarities between EU-
wide and national structural measures. 
- The EMEF could assess whether certain reforms, whose impact is on aggregate supply is 
expected to be large, would justify special access to the central fiscal capacity. Impactful 
reforms amount to a positive supply shock. Closing the output gap requires discretionary 
fiscal action as neither monetary policy nor automatic stabilisers can play such role. 
4.4 Conclusion EMEF and structural reforms 
The discussion above shows that the case for structural policy coordination is stronger than ever. 
The 2008/09 financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises serve as powerful reminders 
that the resilience, dynamism and fiscal sustainability at the national and European levels are 
public goods. Only structural reforms – many of whom conducted at the national level and sub-
ject to national political constraints – can deliver this public good, which is essential for the suc-
cess of the euro. Because local politics does not necessarily internalise the union-wide benefits 
of greater resilience and stronger growth, the resulting externalities as well as the strong com-
plementarities between structural and macroeconomic policies make policy coordination indis-
pensable.  
Other likely elements of a fiscal union aggravate the structural coordination problem even fur-
ther. While proposals aimed at increasing risk sharing are important to strengthen the euro area 
(e.g. Berger et al. 2018), they create moral hazard that runs counter to incentives for reforms.  
In light of these challenges we think that the EMEF could serve as a helpful arrangement for policy 
coordination. In particular, the minister can employ both sticks and carrots to incentivise reforms 
at the national level. Of course, the ultimate success of this approach depends on whether these 
levers are sufficient to overcome local obstacles and secure sufficient ownership. 
5 Optimum provision of European public goods 
through the EU budget 
5.1 Underlying general problem 
The Commission communication only sees a limited EMEF role for the EU Budget, but we want to 
ask whether there could be a wider potential. A functioning EFU should promote the efficient 
provision of public goods and appropriately allocate spending items to different federal layers 
18 EconPol Policy Report    05/2018    Vol. 2    May 2018 
(Oates 2008). For example, items with significant cross-border spillovers or European economies 
of scale are candidates for the European level. This is particularly true if voter preferences are 
aligned across Member States. In a nutshell, the calculus involves a cost-benefit-analysis of cen-
tralisation: With positive spillovers to other jurisdictions within a federation, a decentralised ap-
proach will lead to underprovision of the public good. A central provision with equal cost sharing 
among the local jurisdictions, on the other hand, might not fit local preferences and needs (Bes-
ley and Coate 2003, originally formalised in Oates 1972). Relatedly, an argument in favour of de-
centralisation is that it encourages allocative efficiency, i.e., the public goods match the prefer-
ences of the citizens (Barankay and Lockwood 2007). Other forms of efficiency that can arise 
through decentralisation are an increased accountability of politicians (Seabright 1996) and 
yardstick competition (for an overview see Bordignon et al. 2004). Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
observe a rise in decentralisation internationally and explain it mostly by population and income 
growth. 
Recently, Weiss et al. (2017) have applied this kind of reasoning to existing or potential European 
policies. They find that fields such as agriculture and education should be handled on the na-
tional level, whereas other areas are better delegated to the European level. The policy issues 
associated with the latter have large cross-border spillovers and economies of scale, whereas 
those of the former (agriculture and education) do not. Moreover, in these two policy areas the 
voter preferences across countries are heterogeneous. These findings and recommendations 
correspond to a whole strand of earlier literature (Alesina et al. 2005a, Heinemann and Begg 2006, 
ECORYS et al. 2008) which all point to the conclusion that the European budget’s spending prior-
ities do not correspond to an optimal division of labour between the European and the national 
level. Agricultural and regional spending appears to hold a disproportionately large share of 
Member States and a strikingly lower share for European public goods (e.g. defence, migration, 
development). 
With that in mind, it is worth discerning the policy areas for which a centralisation to the Euro-
pean level could be beneficial. The natural questions are: why is a large weight of the EU budget 
not designated for European public goods? And why do attempts to reform meet a great deal of 
resistance? 
One of the key explanations are “common pool” disincentives. The common pool theory (Shepsle 
and Weingast 1981, Weingast et al. 1981) analyses incentives of political representatives with lo-
cal jurisdictions that jointly decide on the spending from a centralised budget where this budget 
is funded from a jurisdiction-wide taxation.  
As a consequence of usual common pool problems, too much of the budget’s weight is placed on 
local or national goods instead of EU-wide priorities without any clear justifications. This is a 
broad consensus of the literature based on fiscal federalism theory.  
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5.2 Current institutional shortcoming 
In the European context, the EU budget with its EU-wide own resource financing would be con-
sidered the “common pool”. Although the European Commission has the mandate to represent 
the “general interest of the EU” (Commission 2018), decision makers on the EU budget (both in 
the Council and EP) are supportive of those spending categories which are highly visible within 
their constituencies. Their support is a straightforward consequence of the re-election constraint 
and the fact that voters tend to reward policies with high visibility. This explains large support for 
regional or agricultural spending and often low enthusiasm to expand other policies at the costs 
of these budgets with their high popularity among voters at home. Hence, local goods are more 
attractive than European public goods that have a low visibility at home and that might not be 
that attractive for the specific Member State.  
Common pool incentives also explain the pre-occupation of national representatives with net 
balances and “juste retour”. Budget negotiations can become highly politicised, e.g. in case pol-
iticians face re-election concerns at home (Schneider 2013). Hence, in order to please their elec-
torate, Member States do not want to contribute more to the EU budget than they get back, as a 
juste retour attitude would suggest. This net balance approach is intellectually flawed since it is 
based on a too narrow indicator of national self-interest. Nevertheless, it is politically powerful 
and a fact of European life. The crucial questions then become: how would the EU channel these 
incentives and how to do it as to minimise their detrimental effects. 
Theory predicts that common pool disincentives lead to (a) an overexpansion of budgets above 
a welfare-maximising level, (b) an excessive debt level because of the incentive to also use re-
sources from future tax payers, and (c) a structure of the budget with a bias to local projects 
(“pork barrels”). 
Today, EU budgetary institutions offer effective precautions against (a) and (b) but fail to suc-
cessfully cope with (c). The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) sets annual maximum 
amounts that can be spent within the programme period. Moreover, the own resource principle 
states that all expenditures have to be covered by own resources. Hence, these two provisions 
provide effective upper limits on spending pressure resulting from the common pool problem. 
Moreover, the annual budget must be balanced and debt financing of the EU budget is not al-
lowed. Still, we have not addressed the bias towards local public goods, thus the question is 
whether a European Finance Minister would or would not be part of the solution.  
5.3 Merits of an EMEF  
The Commission’s communication on the role of an EMEF (2017a) does not discuss her potential 
role for the EU budget or European public goods beyond a narrow range of euro area related 
policies (Investment Plan). However, they do mention that the common interest of the EU, in-
cluding shared priorities, is ill-represented.  
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How could the EMEF help to improve the efficient allocation of public goods in the European Un-
ion? Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) develop a model to counteract the common pool problem 
in the budget process with two different mechanisms: delegation to a strong finance minister 
versus rule commitment to fiscal targets. In the delegation approach, the finance minister makes 
a first proposal for the budget. The higher her agenda-setting power, the closer the final budget 
will be to her initial proposal and the closer the deficit to the “collectively optimal outcome” (Hal-
lerberg and von Hagen 1999, p.215). The finance minister also monitors the spending ministers 
and can punish or reward them. Relatedly, von Hagen and Harden (1995) suggest that a finance 
minister can reduce administrative uncertainties arising from fiscal illusion created by ministers 
responsible for specific policy areas. In the commitment approach, the government sets its own 
fiscal targets. Also here, someone has to monitor the ministers, and here too can the finance min-
ister take on such responsibility. 
Their considerations could help to answer this chapter’s underlying question of how to maximise 
the EMEF’s effectiveness. However, as already discussed, the EU budget is limited to its own re-
sources; taking on deficit is not an option. Hence, the efficient spending of the EU budget takes 
on broader objectives than simply sound public finances (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999 inves-
tigate this). Moreover, their analysis does not explicitly include the possibility that a strong fi-
nance minister changes the structure of the budget, i.e., that she proposes public goods that have 
not yet been included in the budget.  The responsibilities for some of the potential European 
public goods could be shared between the EU and the Member States, others might be left under 
national responsibility. The EMEF would need to consider the adoption of “new” European public 
goods. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) state that a finance minister would be best suited in one-party 
majority governments, while the commitment approach is better suited multiparty govern-
ments. Clearly, this line of reasoning cannot be directly applied to the EU and to its budget deci-
sion process, where the Council plays a crucial role (through the unanimity requirement on the 
MFF) and where the European Parliament holds subsequent veto power (as the MFF requires the 
consent from the EP, Art. 312 TFEU). However, the divergent interests across Member States (in 
the Council and EP) and across parties (in the EP) can better be analysed by using the multiparty 
analogy from a national system than the one-party majority setting. Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999) point to the difficulty of the delegation approach in a multiparty government as the fi-
nance minister with his party affiliation will then not be recognised as impartial. An analogous 
problem would arise with an EMEF who is a citizen of a Member State and – with an increasingly 
political orientation of the Commission – a member of a party. Hence, Member States might not 
wish to delegate a strong agenda-setting power to an EMEF at the costs of their own veto power. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how an EMEF could achieve a more efficient EU spending structure, 
even if she is influential in the agenda setting for the MFF. It may be more promising to increase 
the relative attraction of European public goods compared to local goods from the perspective 
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of national policy makers. This could be achieved, for example, through higher national co-fi-
nancing rates for public goods with a strong regional or national benefit (Heinemann 2016).  
5.4 Conclusion EMEF and EU budget 
The current EU budget does not place enough weight on European public goods. The misalloca-
tion is a product of the common pool problem and the Council and Parliaments’ juste retour 
mentality. Overall, a budgetary process delegation to an EMEF is inappropriate. It would not be 
well-targeted to the underlying problems and most Member States would be unfavourable to a 
high agenda-setting power of a single person due to heterogeneous preferences. Instead, what 
would be more effective is changing the fiscal incentives of Member States. 
6 Discussion 
To resolve complex governance issues within the EU, the Commission has ambitiously proposed 
the creation of a new institution, the European Minister of Economics and Finance. This policy 
report clarifies the role of the EMEF in the context of the reform debate on a new European Fiscal 
Union (EFU). An important methodological assumption is that the assessment of pros and cons 
of the EMEF is conditional on the intersection between the general approach to EMU reform (e.g. 
Maastricht 2.0 vs. confederal model) and the specific design of the new institution. Hence, for 
obvious reasons of prominence we focused on the Commission’s proposal, but we have also 
sketched how different views may fare comparatively. 
Table 1 below presents a synthesis of the EMEF’s main potential challenges and its possible con-
tributions in light of the four EFU dimensions surveyed in this paper. 
Fiscal sustainability: As predicted by the Optimum Currency Area theory, coexistence of rules 
aimed at fiscal discipline with residual sovereignty after the loss of monetary power remains a 
challenge for a stable and functional EMU. Can the creation of EMEF help overcome these draw-
backs? The Commission's EMEF does not seems very likely to make fiscal rules more credible nor 
to promote long-run sustainability of Member States’ budgetary policies. On the contrary, the 
concept might even exacerbate the problem that opaque and “weighted” political bilateral ne-
gotiations drive SGP interpretations. Less problematic may be a classic checks and balances 
model with clear-cut separation between political prerogatives and independent control. This 
design can be reached with a reformed EFB.  
Stabilisation: The assessment is more favourable for the stabilisation task although here the fu-
ture role of an EMEF crucially depends on whether new euro area stabilisation tools are set up or 
not. If no innovation materialises, the EMEF would be confined to the coordination of national 
fiscal policies, where the notorious problem is resistance created by divergent national interests. 
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The Commission has so far failed to enforce fiscal-space-dependent contributions to the euro 
area fiscal stance. So will the EMEF. One reason may be that the Commission has no clear man-
date to coordinate because this function is not explicitly included in the Treaties, and, so far, it 
has not been endorsed by governments. Hence, once again, the profile and mandate of the EMEF 
vis-à-vis governments’ prerogatives is critical. The potential is clearer if the European level gets 
new “own” stabilisation instruments where the EMEF would be the natural candidate to steer 
and coordinate these instruments. 
Structural reforms: We are largely optimistic with regards to the EMEF’s role as a structural re-
former. An EMEF in control of new central fiscal capacities, along with the aforementioned stabi-
lisation tools, could employ them as “carrots” for reforms. The EMEF would also have a role in 
organising an efficient exchange of information of reforms and best practices. 
European public goods: The Commission’s EMEF would not be helpful in correcting the built-in 
bias in the EU budget that favours regional and national public goods at the expense of European 
public goods. Again, the literature points to more promising remedies that entail new financing 
rules for different types of spending items (with larger national co-financing for national or re-
gional goods). An EMEF would still be confronted with a similar level of heterogeneity in spending 
preferences across Member States and parties in the European Parliament as experienced today. 
Therefore, we remain unconvinced that this institutional innovation would bring any progress.  
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Table 1: Overview of EFU dimensions’ main challenges and potential EMEF contributions 
Current challenge EMEF Contribution 
Fiscal sustainability: overall assessment negative 
The complexity of the existing fiscal govern-
ance rules and benchmarks weakens com-
pliance and encourages a maximalist inter-
pretation of the flexibilities embedded in the 
SGP.  
The greater weight of the Commission (rela-
tive to the Council) in enforcing SGP does not 
help de-politicise enforcement decisions 
which further weakens compliance in larger 
countries and making it uneven across coun-
tries. 
The Commission’s EMEF, who simultaneously serves as Vice Presi-
dent of the Commission and chairs the Eurogroup, is unlikely to meet 
the key challenges. An EMEF may increase opaque and potentially 
disorderly political negotiation vis-à-vis the enforcement of rules. 
This risk may jeopardise potential benefits like greater coherence in 
SGP implementation. 
Priorities in the reform of EU fiscal governance are elsewhere, such as 
in the significant simplification of rules and independent institutions. 
Should the EMEF be put in place, a classic checks and balances model 
is preferable with clear-cut separation of political prerogatives and 
independent control that may be assigned to a reformed EFB. 
Macroeconomic shocks: overall assessment weakly positive 
Not enough fiscal buffers built up in good 
times. 
Harmful lack of coordination of fiscal poli-
cies during the crisis, e.g., between countries 
with less and more fiscal space. 
Common shock absorbers are difficult to im-
plement due to the threat of moral hazard 
and concerns that permanent transfers 
might be the consequence. 
EMEF has potential to better coordinate national fiscal policies based 
on appropriate euro-wide fiscal stance and national fiscal space. 
Coordination (also in consideration of different fiscal spaces) faces 
the challenge of national resistance. The EMEF design is crucial as to 
the way national preference/interests are aggregated in order to 
overcome non-cooperative strategies. 
Structural reforms: overall assessment weakly positive 
Economies of scale and externalities can re-
sult in a low-reform equilibrium. 
Two of the existing institutions, the Euro-
pean Semester and the SGP, have not 
proven sufficient to escape from this equilib-
rium. 
Elements of a deeper fiscal union such as a 
central fiscal capacity and other risk-sharing 
mechanisms create moral hazard issues and 
further weaken states’ incentives to reform. 
EMEF improves cross-national policy coordination both by using new 
instruments and by strengthening existing institutions. 
EMEF supported by persuasive analysis and good communication 
amplifies the reputational costs of lagging-behind reformers. 
EMEF can also use sticks in the form of access to central fiscal capac-
ity when incentivizing the implementation of reforms. 
However, the ultimate success of this approach rests on whether 
these levers are sufficient to overcome local obstacles and secure suf-
ficient ownership. 
Public goods: overall assessment negative 
Common pool disincentives: poor structur-
ing of budget creates politicians’ bias to-
wards local projects (“pork barrels”). 
 
EMEF as budgetary agenda setter would be confronted with hetero-
geneous spending preferences (variety of interests across Member 
States, in the Council and EP, and across parties, in the EP). 
EMEF remains hardly a promising institution to tackle common pool 
disincentives. 
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Bundling of tasks: In addition to this single-issue assessment, it is also important to reflect 
strengths and weaknesses that emerge from the bundling of tasks in one institution and even in 
one person. First of all, multiple responsibilities for one person could lead to a capacity problem. 
Even with strong institutional support, it is hard to imagine that one person could convincingly 
cope with the workload from the long list of responsibilities which the Commission communica-
tion has foreseen. Similarly, the extraordinary responsibility comes with enormous power. A Min-
ister with this broad portfolio would be a powerful player which in itself, from a political economy 
perspective, will raise resistance. It is difficult to imagine that Member States will accept to re-
place a national minister as chairman of the Eurogroup by a Commissioner. A kind of hierarchical 
inconsistency would emerge if the EMEF as the “Number one” (President) of the Eurogroup would 
at the same time be the “Number two” (Vice-President) of the Commission. This idea is particu-
larly toxic as it creates a direct and powerful link between bodies that should have the EU-wide 
interest at heart (EC, ESM/EMF) and those where national political interests typically dominate 
(Eurogroup/Council which by construction looks like a “senate”). 
Bundling of tasks will create both complementarities and conflicts. A potential conflict arises 
from a joint responsibility for both stabilisation and sustainability and the different time perspec-
tives of both issues. The shorter-run interest for stabilisation may lead to larger compromises on 
needs for a fiscally sound policy. This conflict is more dramatic when an insolvent euro country 
is involved. In this case, fiscal sustainability can only be regained with debt restructuring. How-
ever, this may cause short-run uncertainties and macroeconomic turbulences (at least in the ab-
sence of an orderly insolvency procedure). Hence, an EMEF might be tempted to avoid restruc-
turing by activating stabilisation tools to finance the insolvent country. Likewise, the EMEF might 
prefer to “look the other way” on SGP fines as to not be forced to deal with that Member State.  
Despite the risk of conflict, a centralised stabilisation tools in the hands of the EMEF may also 
increase her influence on structural reforms. The EMEF could condition access to a central fiscal 
capacity and other financing mechanisms on compliance with agreed reform programs. This 
would leave the EMEF with harder instruments when incentivising reforms. 
Overall, we find that the EMEF - according to the Commission design - is unlikely to be as much 
of a breakthrough as the Commission had advertised. The intricacies of the EMEF idea, which 
here we have sought to disentangle but not to hide, is however a message in itself: There is a real 
risk that another symbolic reform will be ill-targeted, bring much unsubstantial change and irri-
tate and alienate voters.  
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Appendix - Figure 1: Relative strength of fiscal union 
dimensions in three union blueprints 
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